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Economic Voting: Election Outcomes at the Toss of a Coin?
Damaris Bangean
Department of Political Science, Chapman University; Orange, California
Introduction to Research
• This study explores how economic evaluations shape
presidential approval and election outcomes within the
United States.
• A large body of research reveals that economic
evaluations have a significant impact on voter behavior.
• During any given year, the economic cycle can be in
any stage – upswing or downswing, making economic
downturns prior to election years particularly pivotal.
•In 2008, 90% of all voters perceived that the economy
got worse. If such economic changes can be volatile
and unpredictable, are Presidential election results
then mostly the result of chance?
• By examining the relationships between economic
evaluations and presidential approval, this research
intends to determine the role of economic perception
in voter behavior.
Perception of the US economy
100

Gotten Worse :

Findings

Hypotheses:
H 1: Individuals who approve of the President’s handling of the economy are likely to approve the President’s handling of job.

H 1: Presidential accountability for the economy

H 2: Between retrospective, current, and prospective evaluation of the economy, current economic evaluation is strongest indicator of
Presidential approval.

There is a moderate positive correlation between the
perception of the economy and the president’s handling of
the economy. Furthermore, there is a strong positive
correlation between approval of the president’s handling of
the economy and the president’s handling of
job, demonstrating election-induced accountability for the
economy.

H 3: Voters who blame the former President for poor economic conditions are more likely to approve of the current President.
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The correlation of .526 indicates a moderate relationship between
perception of the economy and Presidential approval.
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Economic Voting Theory
 Economic voting theory suggests that economic
conditions shape electoral outcomes. Good economic
performance keeps parties in office; bad economic
performance casts them out.
 Retrospective vs. Prospective
 Voters are largely retrospective rather than
prospective: they rely on past economic evaluations
rather than future economic evaluations.
 Sociotropic vs. Pocketbook
 Voters are sociotropic. They use aggregate economic
evaluations rather than individual economic evaluations
when deciding how to vote.
 Further studies revealed that voters rely not broadly
on economic growth throughout terms, but narrowly on
conditions in the six months or year before Election Day.
 Furthermore, voters typically view the economy as
“getting better” when their party is in the White House.
This indicates that perhaps it is not merely the state of
the economy, but voter perception of the economy
through the lenses of their ideology, that matters.
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The correlation of .890 indicates a very strong relationship
between approval of President handling economy and approval of
President handling of job.

H 3: The blame game
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Table Interpretations
• There is a strong positive correlation between blaming the
former President for poor economic conditions and approval
of the current President’s handling of the economy.
• The economic crisis of 2008 was a result of the burst of the
market bubble, not federal policy action.
• Party identification plays a significant role in both of these
perceptions, which indicates that party ideology, rather than
knowledge of economic conditions, may shape how voters
perceive both approval of Presidential handling of the
economy and economic conditions themselves.

H 2: Factors affecting Presidential approval:
retrospective, current, and prospective economic evaluation.
Interestingly, the perception of the economy in comparison to
one year ago has a greater significance to presidential
approval than the perception of the current state of the
economy. This demonstrates the strength of retrospective
voting and the pivotal importance of the election year
economy with respect to the previous year.
H 3: The Blame Game
These findings indicate that voter dissatisfaction with the
previous administration’s economic handling is significantly
related to approval of the current administration.
However, this can also be attributed to party
identification, and thus the blame game can played by simply
throwing the blame for poor economic conditions on former
administrations.

Conclusions
 Approval of the president’s handling of the economy
and approval of the president’s handling of job are
strongly related, suggesting election-induced
responsibility for the economy.
Though retrospective economic evaluations have a
strong effect on presidential approval, party
identification plays a greater role in presidential
approval than economic evaluations. This proves that
voters have a greater allegiance to ideology and party
identification than economic fluctuations.
 If economic fluctuations directly determined election
outcomes, it would largely discredit democratic
accountability or the idea that campaigns could change
the outcomes of elections. These findings demonstrate
that the currency of ideology is more important than
currency itself in shaping voter behavior.
 It’s not just “the economy”: it's how you look at
it, because the economy itself is an issue. Ideology is
the framework through which one perceives the issue.
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